MORAL
REALISM AND MORAL RELATIVISM
By: Ron White
As transportation and communication technologies
gradually blur the traditional borders between human communities,
sub-communities, and individuals, and as a result, we seem to be moving toward
a more global socio-economic order, many interesting philosophical puzzles
emerge. Certainly one of the most obvious puzzles is the fact that as we
interact with other humans in this rapidly shrinking global environment we
invariably encounter conflicting beliefs. Some of these conflicting beliefs
raise questions about matters of descriptive fact and some address
matters of prescriptive value. Thus, along with this process of
globalization we increasingly find ourselves either questioning or defending
our existing beliefs. And of course, our beliefs ultimately effect how we
relate with those individuals and communities in that global environment.
But are there, in fact, universal and objective
facts and/or moral values that might serve as the foundation for a global morality?
If there are either universal facts or values, how do these facts and values
relate to one another? As universal knowledge of the facts increases, does that
necessarily increase our knowledge of the universal values that ought to be
upheld by this rapidly emerging global community?
Traditionally, philosophers have offered two
opposing theories that might explain the ultimate nature of Truth and Values: realism
and relativism.
REALISM
Simply stated, realism claims that there are
at least some timeless universal facts or timeless universal values that serve
as the foundation for our true beliefs. Scientific realism argues that
there are, at least some descriptive beliefs that are timeless and universally
true, and independent of what individuals or communities think about those
facts. “Water boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit at sea level “ comes to mind. If
you believe it boils at 32 degrees Fahrenheit at sea level you are objectively
wrong. It is also a fact that worldwide, most human females are subject to
domination by males, and systematically deprived of their liberty and are often
physically abused by males.
Moral realism argues that there at least some prescriptive beliefs that are
similarly true, that correspond to values that are universally good, and
independent of what individuals or communities think about those values.
Although it is a fact that many patriarchal societies believe in female
inequality and that it is morally acceptable for men to physically abuse their
wives and children, most of us in the Western world believe that this kind of
behavior is morally unacceptable that those who believe otherwise are both
wrong and bad. (You’re not a bad person if you have a false belief in respect
to the boiling point of water. That’s why most Western countries have laws
against spousal and child abuse, but do not have laws against harboring false
beliefs concerning the boiling point of water.) But is there some way to
establish a foundational universal morality that would apply to all human beings
at all times and in all places? Or simply stated, are there “Universal human
rights and duties?”
Philosophically, the Western concept of human rights
is usually invokes reference to some form of timeless universality.
Philosophically, if there are timeless and universal moral truths, there must
be some sort of a timeless and universal foundation for that belief. Foundationalism,
(or realism) is rooted in a theory of Truth and/or Value based on a
one-to-one correspondence between belief and reality. Hence, true beliefs
correspond to the dictates of foundational reality and false beliefs contradict
that reality. In the Western tradition, moral truth serves as the foundation
for universal human rights and the duties and obligations that support those rights.
Hence, if all women have a universal right to not to be beaten by their
husbands, then husbands have a universal obligation to refrain from that
activity. If there are in fact timeless
universal moral truths, then there must also be some timeless universal
sanctions that enforce morality.
Historically, moral philosophers have defended two
alternative foundations for universal morality: supernaturalism and naturalism.
Supernaturalism invokes the moral authority of forces external to the
natural order. Historically, this has most often been invoked in the guise of
deontological moral theories, especially divine command theory. Hence,
universal moral truth is based on the “Word of God” as revealed by the writings
and/or testimony of human beings that serve as intermediaries between the
natural and the supernatural worlds. These intermediaries usually base
universality on the idea that all human beings are children of the same good,
omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient God. Hence, the unquestioned authority of
God is usually supported by our inability to escape God’s timeless and
universal vigilance to detect non-compliance with universal rules, and our
inability to resist God’s timeless and universal enforcement of those rules.
Naturalism argues that the foundation for morality lies in the facts
of human nature. The Western liberal tradition, which is based on natural law,
has identified a variety of particular facts about human nature that might
serve as the foundation for moral truth: most notably, the attributes of atomic
individuality, rationality and free will.
Atomic individuality
basically affirms that despite our propensity to live in groups, we are,
nevertheless, self-interested individuals by nature. Hence, moral rules that
promote the advancement of individual self-interest are grounded in the facts
of human nature. The human attribute of rationality is usually invoked as
natural means by which human beings come to know either facts or values and
free will refers to the ability to human beings to, not only know what’s
right, but also the ability to do what’s right. Taken together,
rationality and free will serve as the foundation for holding human beings
responsible for their behavior: that is to say, that we can be held responsible
for knowing what’s right and doing it and that when nature impedes either
reason or free will we do not hold those individuals responsible for immoral or
illegal behavior.
Sometimes individuality, rationality and free will
are attributed to divine creation. Sometimes they are attributed to the blind
forces of evolution. But the basic idea is that nature has endowed the vast
majority of human beings with the ability to know moral rules and the ability
to follow those rules. Enforcement of these rules can emanate from either
supernatural or natural sources.
Timelessly universal moral truths are often
attributed to rationality alone, which is usually explained in terms of
timelessly universal like-mindedness. Of course likemindedness can be explained
in supernatural terms via the God and an eternal human soul, or in natural
terms involving a neuronic human brain.
Some realists attribute morality to reason
and likemindedness, while others point to feelings and sentience
as the universal foundation. Hedonists, for example, argue that feelings of pleasure
indicate the moral good, and feelings of pain signify morally bad.
Now if feelings provide a foundation for universal morality, then empirically,
we should be able to identify a certain list of universal pleasurable feelings
and universal painful feelings that underscore moral and immoral behavior. Many
even argue that these feelings serve as the objective foundation for universal
rules. For example: the moral principle of utility (Greatest Happiness
Greatest Number) can be justified based on the universality of feelings of
pleasure and pain; beneficence, non-maleficence can be based on feelings
of sympathy; liberty can be based on the human pursuit of pleasure
and avoidance of pain; and justice can be based on feelings of
retribution.
Evolutionary ethics is based on the idea that our moral feelings are
rooted in our evolutionary history and that these feelings somehow facilitate
the transmission of human genes via sexual reproduction. Hence, evolutionary
ethics often seeks to establish morality based on detailed empirical knowledge
of our central nervous system, brains and their genetic foundations.
Evolutionary ethicists, therefore, argue that despite the apparent cultural
diversity of moral prescriptions, at least some universal prescriptions that
are evidenced by feelings and behaviors universally generated by our bodies,
which are genetically programmed. For example, they argue that human behavior
is universally rooted in egoistic self-interest. Therefore, in the real
world altruism is most frequently exercised toward family (kin
altruism). The strength feelings of sympathy are proportionate to the
likelihood that we share genes with that person. That’s why it’s so difficult
for us to reach into our pockets to help out distant nations that are starving
to death.
There are many other examples. Take another example,
our universal moral condemnation of cannibalism and incest suggest an
evolutionary foundation. So does our universal moral demand for retribution for
acts of injustice perpetrated by other human beings. Finally, we tend to
possess feelings that drive us to reconcile with our former
enemies.
Also included within this evolutionarily-based line
of moral reasoning is the idea that our social and political instincts are also
rooted in human nature and that morality is linked to our natural propensity to
organize ourselves in hierarchical groups comprised of leaders and followers.
Keep in mind that the lines between supernaturalism
and naturalism are not always crystal clear as many supernaturalists see nature
as endowed with divine presence and many naturalists, more or less endow nature
with divine attributes without invoking supernatural agency. Kantian ethics is
probably the best example of a universal moral system based on natural law that
blurs the line between supernaturalism and naturalism by requiring us to act on
universal principles, even if it means refraining from perfectly natural
self-interested behavior.
Again, the basic problem with evolutionary ethics
and all moral systems based on natural law is that nature also seems to have
programmed us with an awful lot of immoral behavior too. Commonsense seems to
tell us that just because a particular behavior is natural does not necessarily
imply that it is good.
RELATIVISM
Relativism is simply the denial of the either
descriptive or prescriptive universality. It usually implies that our beliefs
about Truth and/or Value are contextually conditioned. Here the criterion for
Truth and/or Value is internal logical consistency, or coherence.
A coherence theory of Truth and/or Value, therefore, distinguishes
between true/good belief and false/bad beliefs based on the existing
relationship between new beliefs and old beliefs; that is, new beliefs are
accepted or rejected based on what an individual, sub-community, or community
has already been accepted as true or good. So if a new belief contradicts old
beliefs already held as true, then based on logic, we must either reject the
new belief as false, or reject the old belief(s) that contradict that new
belief. It is important to note that social scientists tell us that when there
is a conflict between old beliefs and new beliefs, that there is a strong
tendency for human beings to maintain old beliefs. This tendency to preserve
old beliefs is embedded in the idea of a practice or tradition.
Finally, new beliefs that are consistent with an
already existing body of old beliefs, or a tradition, are easier to nurture
than new beliefs that contradict old beliefs.
Full blown relativists typically dismiss or downplay biological
foundationalism and argue that all beliefs are relative to some already
existing body of belief, or tradition and that human nature is infinitely
malleable.
So relativists argue that truth and/or value are
matters of tradition and logical consistency. Philosophers have discerned two
basic theories that attempt to deal with the question of the level at which
logical consistency is to be invoked, which establishes the foundation for
ultimate authority on matters of fact or value: individualism and
communitarianism.
Individualism states that conflicts of belief can only be resolved only at the level
of individual belief systems and that Truth and/or Value are, essentially,
matters of personal belief. Hence, if you and I, as individuals, disagree on a
question of Truth and/or Value, there is no real conflict or contradiction and
there is no external authority that can resolve our disagreement. Full-blown
absolute individualists argue that both Truth and Value are like “matters of
taste” “You like apples, I like oranges.” And, therefore, are incommensurable.
So, if you believe water boils at 32 degrees and that wife beating is morally
acceptable, that’s OK. Your beliefs are as valid as mine. There is no way to
reconcile the contradiction.
The problem with absolute individualism is that it
tends toward descriptive and prescriptive anarchy, which undermines our
most basic, common sense notions about Truth and Value, and community. Indeed
some individuals always express beliefs that are in obvious contradiction to
the beliefs expressed by the overwhelming majority of a community. Although
there are at least some communities that tolerate various degrees of
descriptive and prescriptive anarchy within their ranks, there are very few
real life communities that actually believe in full-blown absolute
individualism.
Communitarianism (or cultural relativism) is most often associated with the
philosophical doctrine that holds that our beliefs concerning matters of Truth
and/or Value are relative to human communities. Cultural Relativists,
therefore, argue that there is no universal foundation for human beliefs
outside of a specific cultural context. But conflicting beliefs between
individuals and communities can be authoritatively resolved in favor of the
sentiment expressed by communities. Hence, Truth and/or Value are essentially
“constructed” by communities and most often venerated as traditions. Thus we can
discern two rather amorphous forms of communitarianism: small group
communitarianism and large group communitarianism.
Small group communitarians argue that small groups,
or organizations such as families, local government, religions etc. either, as
a matter of fact, make truth and/or value; or they ought to make
truth and/or value. Hence, small group communitarians seek to protect the
autonomous beliefs (and traditions) of small groups from border raids staged by
opposing individuals, opposing small groups, or opposing large groups. In the
United States, small group communitarianism is often reflected in questions of
legal jurisdiction at the local, state, or federal level; and in issues that
involve the “rights” of small religious communities (e.g. Jehovah’s Witnesses)
to make Truth and/or Value without interference from local, state, or federal
governmental agencies.
Toleration
is one of the core values that underlie Western liberal societies. It expresses
our belief that individual and small communities have a right to believe
whatever they want, so long as their beliefs do not harm others. Of course,
many individuals, small groups, and large groups embrace intolerance as a moral
principle in order to shield their own beliefs from outside interference. So
small group communitarianism embraces the idea that Truth and/or Value are
relative to the beliefs held by any identifiable microcosmic community. Of
course, this raises the obvious question of how many individuals constitute a
community. Do families have an unlimited right to manufacture Truth and/or
Value? And of course, small groups are comparatively powerless in relation to
larger communities, which raise questions of how to enforce the rights of small
groups that reside amidst larger intolerant groups. Conversely, large group
communitarians argue that matters of Truth and/or Value can only be resolved at
the macrocosmic level; that is at the level of nations, civilizations, or in
the case of business organizations at the level of an industry. Universalistic
communitarians relegate truth and/or value to the global community.
The idea of a tradition is philosophically and
scientifically murky. At least some behaviors that we attribute to longstanding
cultural tradition (both good and bad), actually, are embedded in human nature
and have some sort of a universal biological foundation. On the other hand,
many traditions are obviously nurtured by social and political regimes
or authorities that lead families, local communities, organizations,
nations, and civilizations. Those traditions that are solely the product of social
learning are cultivated in followers by leaders, and sustained almost
entirely by enforced repetition. Realists simply argue that it is much easier
to enforce a tradition that has some sort of a biological foundation. For
example, given the worldwide prevalence of egoism, racism, sexism, and
xenophobia, and war suggest a biological foundation, which means that it’s
probably fairly easy to maintain traditions that promote self-interest,
discriminate against racial minorities, women, and other cultures. Conversely,
it is very difficult to maintain moral traditions based on equality and peace.
Given the worldwide distain for incest and cannibalism, it would be very
difficult to introduce and maintain those practices as cultural traditions.
Traditions that have no biological foundation or run counter to human nature
require increasing coercive methods of indoctrination and are often enforced by
civil laws enforced by punishment. The most idiosyncratic traditions and
beliefs that contradict common sense are most often nurtured by reference to
supernatural authorities and backed up with both worldly and otherworldly
threats.
In sum, as
we become exposed to the beliefs of others, I think all we like to believe that
at least some of our beliefs correspond to objective universal Truth. We also
like to believe there are at least at least some beliefs that reflect universal
Goodness. And we, as a matter of fact, act on the basis of that belief. Although
we may tolerate, at least some variance expressed by some individuals and
communities, all humans at all times and in all places believe that truth and
goodness are universal. Unfortunately, when we encounter beliefs that conflict
with our own, we always seem to identify that universality with our own
beliefs, and therefore, seek to convince others that our beliefs are universal
and that theirs are not. When we cannot convince others that our beliefs are
True, we also tend to use force to inflict our beliefs on them.
Now if we believe that the standards of Truth and/or
Value are predicated at the global universal level, we are saying that there
are at least some beliefs concerning Truth and/or Value that all human beings
embrace or, at least ought to embrace. This is a form of universalism,
which states that false beliefs held by individuals and sub-communities, can be
identified in reference to a set of universal beliefs embraced by the global
community. The basic problem with universal Globalism is the absence
of an international regime capable of enforcing universal laws. For better or
worse, as long as there are nations and religious traditions that possess
enough coercive power to resist international compliance, self-interested
nationalism will prevail over universal Globalism.
HISTORICAL RELATIVISM
Of course the beliefs held by individuals,
sub-communities, and communities change over time. Historical Relativism
asserts that Truth and/or Value is relative to the cohered beliefs held at some
particular time and that there is no way to resolve conflicts between
generations of believers. Therefore, we in the present cannot judge the past
based on present standards of Truth and/or Value. So cultural relativists argue
that inter-cultural beliefs are incommensurable and that there is no way
to resolve conflicting beliefs between cultures living at the same time.
Historical relativists state that intra-cultural beliefs expressed at various
points of time within the history of a culture are also incommensurable and
that there is no way to resolve conflicting beliefs between generations.
Therefore, relativist historians are will not pass judgment on the beliefs of
the past. The best they can do, is document the historical context of the
beliefs expressed by past generations. Our beliefs and the beliefs of the past
are incommensurable.
Of course, this raises eyebrows when historians of
science look back on the obviously fallacious scientific theories of the past
(such as the Aristotelian geocentric universe or the Hippocratic Doctrine of
the Humors) and cannot make the commonsense assertion that these theories have
been falsified and do not correspond to reality. Rather, they must make strange
sounding statements like: “Those theories were true back in the fifth century
B.C., but they are false today.” In terms of morality, relativists look back on
seemingly immoral practices such as slavery and argue that slavery was morally
justified in early 19th century Virginia, but became immoral late in
the century. Relativists cannot assert that plantation owners were immoral or
that they didn’t know that slavery was wrong until it was “discovered” late in
the century. The best historical relativists can do is explain why past
generations believed what they did relative to other widely held beliefs (facts
and or values) at the time. In short, present historians cannot judge the
beliefs of past generations as either false or bad.
Some stalwart realist historians believe that
although our beliefs do in fact change over time, that process of change is
evolutionary, and that, over the long run, our beliefs are at least progressing
closer to the ideals of Truth and Goodness. So when they encounter the fact
that past societies believed that “The earth is the center of the universe” and
that “Human slavery is good.” They can at least argue that although those
beliefs were true in historical context, but false relative to our present
context. And although, some future generation may make similar judgments about
our beliefs, they would agree that our beliefs about the universe and slavery
were at least closer to the Truth than the beliefs of previous
generations.